The same conditioning applies to the use of the term ‘Islamic State'. When thought of in its historical narrative, we automatically assume ‘The Rise and Fall' of the Islamic State.  Read the title closely though (I'm sure you've already re-read it). Yes, your eyes don't deceive you, it reads ‘The Fall and Rise‘ of the Islamic State.

Wow, so a book talking about the rise of the Islamic State, coming from someone described in many circles as one of the leading intellectuals of our time? I had to go buy it.

I'm not really up for a detailed review of the book, it would take me too long to think up all those pithy statements that would make it sound like a real review. In summary though, if you want a penetrating and concise answer to why Muslims around the world call for a restoration of the Islamic State, when in the perception of Western minds this is equated with medieval barbarisms - then you should read this book.

Noah Feldman has the scholarship (and the honesty) to know that the history of the Islamic State is not one where a civilisation is only characterised by stonings and amputations. The shari'yah is the law for Muslims, and how sad it is, that law for Muslims only exists in the narrow gallows of punishments? So Feldman at least begins with the correct premise: that the call for the Islamic State, is the call for shar'iyah - this is the call for law itself. Incidentally, this is what Feldman was attacked for in the New York Times Magazine for indirectly promoting Islam as the basis of a political order.

Anyways, the book is divided into three main parts: What Went right? Decline and Fall; and Rise of the New Islamic State.

Again read the book, if you want to know all the details. What I want to concentrate on though is a very common theme that transcends over the whole book - which is the discussion of the role of the ‘ulema in the Islamic State.

As the book describes, for what went initially right, was that the ‘ulema maintained their central role as the guardians of shar'iyah. This seems like a well known point, but we often lose sight of a very distinguishing fact of the Islamic State - that the State is subservient to the shar'iyah, and not the shar'iyah being subservient to the State. In Feldmans words the ‘ulema were the ‘gatekeepers' of the shar'iyah. Ultimately this meant the State was kept in check by the ‘ulema. Any volition by the State not according to the shar'iyah would be answerable to the ‘ulema, who in effect were the counterbalance to the State.

Next the book continues with Feldmans analysis of why the Islamic State declined. Continuing with the discussion of the ‘ulema, Feldman postulates that the specific steps the Ottomans took with the Tanzimat reforms and the establishment of the Mecelle, led to the resounding loss of power for the ‘ulema. For while the Tanzimat reforms were then viewed in a positive light to modernise the Ottoman State, nobody apparently had the prescience to realise that it took the role of understanding the shar'iyah away from the ‘ulema and had given it to the State. The codification of Islamic Law, would mean that judges from the non-scholarly class would be heirs to legislation. Eventually, this allowed the likes of the Young Turks to grow, whose fruits bore the likes of Kemal Attaturk (may Allah curse him). With the ‘ulema no longer in the position of acting as a counterbalance, the final death blow to the Islamic State was given by Attaturk in 1924.

In the final part of the book, Feldman takes a look at both Saudi Arabia and Iran, two states with a functioning ‘ulema class, neither of which are really Islamic though (my words). He seemingly also gives a great deal of currency to the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) as an example of an Islamic group working for the return of the Islamic State. I may disagree here, but he raises an interesting point. The MB may advocate for the supremacy of the shar'iyah, but are they advocating for the elevation and the supremacy of the ‘ulema? In Feldmans view, this is seemingly not the case since such groups have inadvertently also assumed the role the ‘ulema, since they have now become the ‘gatekeepers' of the shar'iyah. The book pretty much concludes with the question of the role of the ‘ulema still in debate for the foreseeable Islamic State.

Overall, the book has really got me thinking. Despite our admiration for the ‘ulema, we don't tend to think of them as an entity with any real power. They have become religious figureheads, overseeing our ‘otherworldy' affairs. In contrast view the recent turmoil in Pakistan, where there had been uproar over the dismissal of the Chief Justice Iftikar Choudhary - a man who holds the law in one hand and the panic of the goverment in the other. Rarely would you see such consideration given for the ‘ulema. Who sadly no longer hold any noble positions in society, with no approbation or even esteem for their diminished roles.

Its strange given that the ‘ulema were men who did not command armies, have huge wealth at their disposal, and rarely did they hold government posts. Yet they carried incredible eminence in the Islamic State. They were the heirs of the Prophets, the guiding light for the Ummah and the restraint that held down hands of the rulers. There is no comparable class of people in any other society or civilisation. One that we pray is brought back to its rightful place with the return of the Islamic State.